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Abstract
Many economic experiments are run in the laboratory with stu-
dents as participants. In this paper we use a newspaper experiment to
learn more about external validity of lab research. Our workhorse is
the Yes-No game. Unlike in ultimatum games responders of the Yes-
No games do not know the proposal when deciding between whether
to accept it or not. We use two diﬀerent amounts that can be shared
(100¤ and 1000¤). In line with ﬁndings for the ultimatum game,
oﬀers were fairer and rejections less likely when participants are older
and submit their decisisons via mail rather than the Internet. By com-
paring our results with other studies (using executives or students),




Quite often in life one has to decide whether to accept a proposal or not
without knowing what exactly is oﬀered. Examples are so-called experience
goods whose quality is not known to customers and partnership proposals
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 006without knowing how reliable the partner(s) will be, as often in the case
of employment, joint ventures, or spouse relationships. Studying situations
where one has to accept or reject with knowing what exactly has been oﬀered
is therefore of enormous importance.
One can capture aspects of such problematic decision making by (possibly
binary versions of) trust games (e.g. Berg et al., 1995) where the uncertainty
of what one accepts or not is due to others having not yet ecided. Typi-
cally others only have to act when one accepts. The Yes-No game, however,
captures situations where the order of decisions is reversed.
Like for experience goods where ﬁrst the producers select their quality
which customers can only assess after buying, it is assumed that
• ﬁrst proposers suggest how to share given positive monetary amounts
(100¤ or 1000¤ in our experiment) and
• then responders decide whether to accept or not without knowing the
proposal how to share.
When played sequentially, responders thus have to accept or reject an oﬀer
which could be known which they, however, do not know when deciding. In
our newspaper experiment, we cannot capture such psychological subtleties
since we use the strategy vector method: each participant does not only
decide for both pie sizes (100¤ and 1000¤) but also as a proposer and as a
responder. Although it does not matter game theoretically, experimentally
observed behavior may depend on how (sequential play, strategy (vector)
mode) choices are elicited. Oxoby and McLeish (2004), for instance, study
an ultimatum game and ﬁnd few diﬀerences between the strategy vector
method and a sequential protocol.
From ultimatum games (see Camerer, 2003, for a survey of ultimatum ex-
periments), Yes-No games diﬀer since responders in ultimatum games know
what they accept or reject. Unlike to dictator experiments (e.g. Forsythe et al.,
1993), the responder in Yes-No games still has full veto power in the sense
that without his consent the pie of 100¤ or 1000¤ is lost. Compared to
former Yes-No experiments (Gehrig et al., 2007), our study diﬀers since
2
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pie in a within-subjects design,
• it employs not only the strategy vector method but elicits also (1st
order) expectations concerning the typical behavior in the other role,
• it is mainly performed with 871 readers of a Thuringian newspaper,
the OTZ whose behavior we can compare with 128 executives of a
large business company.1
• Participants could voluntarily reveal their age and gender, and
• participated either via cutting out the newspaper part, ﬁlling it out,
and mailing it or via using an internet platform.
Thus, we can test the robustness of former ﬁndings (Gehrig et al., 2007)
which exclusively rely on lab studies with student participants with respect
to
• socio-demographic background variables (like student vs. non-student,
age, gender, executive vs. newspaper reader)
• the size of the pie as well as random payment (only 20 pairs, 10 for
100¤ and 1000¤ each, were randomly selected for payment)
• external validity (lab vs. non-lab/newspaper readers vs. business ex-
ecutives)
• elicitation mode (strategy vector, describing own choices, and strategy
vector describing one’s expectations how others will typically decide).
A major aim of this study is to learn more about external validity of labo-
ratory experiments. Many laboratory experiments are done with students.
Members of this subset of the population have a similar age and a similar
level of education. Hence, traditional laboratory experiments do not allow
1As usual the speciﬁcs of the company will not be revealed by us.
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the question how far results from the lab can be generalised.
Experimentalists can increase the variance of socio-demographic charac-
teristics in the subject pool in several ways. In particular two games have
been studied with a more heterogeneous population: The ultimatum game
and the trust game.
Roth et al. (1991) study the ultimatum game with 79 students from diﬀer-
ent nationalities and ﬁnd clear diﬀerences in behaviour between these groups.
Murnighan and Saxon (1998) looks at the behaviour of 331 children and ﬁnds
that generosity in the ultimatum game decreases with age. In a similar study
with 310 children Harbaugh et al. (2003) ﬁnd that, once on controls for size,
generosity increases with age. G¨ uth et al. (2003) run a newspaper exper-
iments with the ultimatum game. With 1035 participants they ﬁnd that
the medium of participation, internet or email, has an eﬀect on generos-
ity. G¨ uth et al. (2007) look at a three-person ultimatum game. They have
5132 participants and ﬁnd that fairness and rejection rates increase with age.
K¨ ohler et al. (2007) play an ultimatum game with a heterogeneous sample of
334 German adults. According to their study generosity increases with age
and income. Bellemare et al. (2008) integrate experiments into an existing
survey, the Dutch CentER panel. They have 1214 participants who play ei-
ther the the ultimatum or the dictator game. One ﬁnding is that generosity
increases with age.
The trust game has been studied by Fehr and List (2004) who compare
the behaviour of 126 students with that of 76 CEOs. CEOs turn out to be
more trusting, more trustworthy, and punish less. Fehr et al. (2003) report
data from a trust game with a randomly selected sample of 429 German
households. Bellemare and Kr¨ oger (2007) compare behaviour in the trust
game played by 100 students and 499 households of the CentER panel. They
ﬁnd a hump-shaped relation between age and trust, and a u-shaped rela-
tion between age and trustworthiness. Bornhorst et al. (2004) play a trust
game with 110 Ph.D. students of diﬀerent nationalities and, ﬁnd signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in trust and trustworthiness between diﬀerent regions of origin.
Sutter and Kocher (2007) study a trust game played by 662 participants
4
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and trust and increasing trustworthiness with age.
Other games that have been studied with heterogeneous groups of par-
ticipants include the beauty-contest game of Bosch-Domenech et al. (2002)
or the prisoners’ dilemma in the TV show “Friend or Foe” studied by List
(2006).
All these studies show that, although we can learn a lot from a student
subject pool, participants of a diﬀerent age or a diﬀerent level of education
might behave diﬀerently. It is, hence, essential to compare behaviour of
student participants with a more heterogeneous population. This is what we
want to do in this paper.
In section 2, we introduce the design of the newspaper experiment which
essentially coincides with that of the experiment with business executives.
Section 3 discusses some hypotheses which, in section 4 , are tested with the
help of the rather large data sets (involving 871 participants from the news-
paper experiment and 128 business exectutives, altogether 999 participants).
Section 5 concludes.
2 Experiment
On Saturday, 6 September 2008, and on Saturday, 13 September, the Ost-
th¨ uringer Zeitung (Gera, Germany) published the instructions to an exper-
iment in their weekend supplement. A translation of the instructions can
be found on our webpage http://www.kirchkamp.de/ja-nein/. These in-
structions also contained a link to a web page with essentially the same
instructions and the same format. Furthermore, on Tuesday, 30 September,
the newspaper published a note with the link to the web page. Readers of
the newspaper knew that they could participate in the experiment either by
mail or through the internet. They were also told that we would select 40
participants who would actually play the game.
The game can be described as follows:
• First, the 40 participants are randomly grouped into 20 pairs of two
5


















































































































mail 303 100.0 57.1 96.0 49.8 50.0 65.0 27.4
internet 568 100.0 44.5 82.2 39.0 40.0 61.4 13.5
all 871 100.0 48.9 87.0 43.2 43.0 62.7 18.5
players.
• One of these two players will be the proposer in the Yes-No game (X-
player), the other the responder (Y -player).
• A random draw decides for each pair the amount that is to be divided.
For 10 pairs the amount is 100¤, for the other 10 pairs the amount is
1000¤.
• The X-player chooses a division. To simplify the evaluation of the ques-
tionnaires we only allow 10 divisions between 5¤ and 95¤ when 100¤
could be divided. Similarly, divisions between 50¤ and 950¤ were al-
lowed when 1000¤ could be divided (see also the translation of the
instructions on our webpage http://www.kirchkamp.de/ja-nein/).
• Simultaneously, the Y -player chooses “yes” or “no”.
• In case of“yes”, the amount is divided according to the proposal of the
X-player. In case of “no”both players receive zero.
We used the strategy vector method, i.e. all participants submitted strategies
and expectations for both amounts (100¤ and 1000 ¤) and for both positions
in the game (X and Y ).
Table 1 shows characteristics of participants from the newspapers exper-
iment. Since some participants did not reveal their age or their profession
the table also shows the proportion of participants where we “know” these
properties. Figure 1 shows the estimated density of age in our sample.
6
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Essentially the same method was also used in June 2008 to elicit choices
of 128 business executives. For this subset of the data we have no information
about age and sex.
3 Hypotheses
It is probably needless to state that a materially opportunistic responder
should accept the unknown but necessarily positive oﬀer. Anticipating such
opportunism, an equally opportunistic proposer should oﬀer the lowest pos-
sible amount. We, however, do expect only few participants to behave in line
with such common(ly known) opportunism.
Whether “stakes” matter is often explored by using the same stakes in
rich and poor countries, i.e., stake variation relies on large discrepancies of
living conditions (see, e.g. Cameron, 1999). The possible disadvantage of
confounding “stake” and culture is avoided by stake variation in our within-
subjects design: the very same participants decide for a small (100¤) and a
much larger (1000¤) pie. But which stake eﬀects do we expect?
Hypothesis S: “Stakes”
1. In view of the stake independence, observed for ultimatum games,
7
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 006we expect the relative shares, oﬀered by proposers for both pie
sizes, to be rather similar, although we expect quite some hetero-
geneity of individual behavior.
2. Although game theoretically (assuming non monetary payoﬀ max-
imization) responders should accept, some responder participants
will use the small pie (100¤) to “teach fairness to proposers”, by
rejecting in case of small pie while accepting in case of the large
one (1000¤).
3. Similarly to Gehrig et al. (2007), we, however, expect the rejection
rates to be quite low.
By comparing the ﬁndings of Gehrig et al. (2007) with ours, we hope to
conﬁrm
Hypothesis EV: “External Validity”
At least for the large pie (1000¤) the results do not diﬀer much between
newspaper participants, business executives, where we rely essentially
on the same elicitation method, and student participants (based on
diﬀerent elicitation).
With respect to socio-demographic variables, we will test
Hypothesis SD: “Socio-Demographics”
1. There is no signiﬁcant gender eﬀect.
2. Age matters a lot since older participants oﬀer more as proposers
and are less likely to reject as responders what is magniﬁed by
their expectations.
3. There is “more fairness in the mail than in the internet”.2
Hypothesis E: “Expectations”
2G¨ uth et al. (2003) found in a newspaper experiment based on the ultimatum game sig-
niﬁcantly higher demands and also higher acceptance rates for participants who submitted
their decision through the internet.
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icantly conﬁrmed by choice than by expectation data when claiming
no diﬀerence whereas expectation data are expected to be more reac-
tive, i.e., heterogeneity more likely triggers diﬀerent expectations than
diﬀerent behavior.
More generally, one could predict that younger, e.g. student participants
will be more clearly aware of the crucial aspect of the Yes-No game (that
responder participants are buying a pig in a poke) than other participants
for whom the Yes-No game might appear rather similar to the ultimatum
game and possibly to the dictator game. For responder behavior this is, of
course, hardly testable (there is no simple way to compare conditional with
unconditional or even no responses).
But for proposer behavior one could easily test this by comparing the
relative oﬀers in ultimatum, dictator, and Yes-No games for both, student
participants and non-student participants. We do not postulate an appropri-
ate hypothesis concerning such diﬀerent game dependence of diﬀerent types
of participants and will only comment on this in the concluding section.
4 Results
We present the results by investigating whether they conﬁrm the hypotheses
stated above.
Hypothesis S-1 (stake independence of oﬀers): The left part of ﬁgure
2 shows a histogram of relative oﬀers for the two pie sizes. We see
that the majority of players oﬀers slightly less than one half. For an
amount of 100¤ the average oﬀered share is 0.375 of the entire amount,
for an amount of 1000¤ the average oﬀered share is with 0.361 slightly
smaller. This diﬀerence is small, but signiﬁcant. An exact (Streitberg
and R¨ ohmel) paired Wilcoxon test yields a p-value of 0.00001, a paired
t-test yields a p-value of 0.00003. Both contradict hypothesis S-1.
S-2 (rejection-behaviour) When the amount is 100¤ then 7.2% of all
participants reject, whereas, when the amount is 1000¤, only 4.9%
9
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of all participants reject. The diﬀerence is signiﬁcant. A one-sided
Fisher’s exact test for indepence yields a p-value of 0.0282. This is in
line with hypothesis S-2.
S-3 (low rejection rates) In our experiment we ﬁnd rejection rates of 7.2%
when the amount is 100¤ and 4.9% when the amount is 1000¤. We
compare these ﬁgures with the laboratory experiment by Gehrig et al.
(2007) who ﬁnd for the Yes-No game 0% and for the ultimatum game
2.8%.3 Apparently, with newspaper readers rejection rates are signif-
icantly higher. A binomial test against rejection levels of 2.8% ﬁnds
rejection levels in our experiment signiﬁcantly higher (p = 0.00000 for
100¤ and also p = 0.00000 for 1000¤).
Compared to student participants newspaper readers do not refrain as
clearly from vetoing somehow questions hypothesis S-3.
EV (external validity) The left graph in ﬁgure 3 shows the empirical dis-
tribution of oﬀers for diﬀerent experiments. The solid line shows oﬀers
3We are grateful to Gehrig et al. (2007) for providing the raw data of their experiment.
Here we refer only to what Gehrig et al. (2007) call their “ﬁrst experiment series”. The
games in their “second experiment series” were embedded in a bidding mechanism which
can not easily be compared to the game we study here.
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in a newspaper experiment, the dashed line shows results from a very
similar experiment with business executives (conducted in June 2008),
the dotted line shows oﬀers from the lab experiment by Gehrig et al.
(2007). One main observation from the lab is conﬁrmed by newspaper
readers and business executives: oﬀers are always clearly larger than
game theoretically predicted one (the smallest positive oﬀer). How-
ever, we also see that relative oﬀers are clearly smaller for the student
population in the lab than for readers of the newspaper or business
executives.
The graph on the right side in ﬁgure 3 shows the empirical relative
frequency to reject oﬀers. We see that the pattern is similar in the
newspaper experiment and with business executives: with larger stakes
participants are more cautious. Business executives are generally more
cautious anyway. We also see that behaviour in the lab is fundamentally
diﬀerent. All participants in the laboratory accepted their unknown
oﬀer.
SD (oﬀers) The left part of ﬁgure 4 shows how average oﬀers depend on the
age group. We see that for both amounts, 100¤ and 1000¤, and also
for actual decisions as well as for expected decisions, the oﬀer increases
11
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Graphs show own choices (own) and expected choices (exp.) of the other player. The lines
are lowess-splines based on R’s plsmo function.
with age. This is similar to what Sutter and Kocher (2007) observe for
trust games. There trustworthiness increases with age. However, trust
follows a hump-shaped relation in Sutter and Kocher (2007).
More formally, we estimate the following random eﬀects model:
oﬀer
amount
= β1 · d1 + β1000¤ · d1000¤ + βage · age + βinternet · dinternet+
β| · d| + νi + ǫik (1)
where d1000¤ is a dummy which is one if the amount is 1000¤ and
zero otherwise, dinternet is a dummy that is one for participants who
submitted their strategy through the internet and zero otherwise, and
d| is a dummy that is one for male participants and zero otherwise.
νi is a random eﬀect for each participant and ǫik is a random eﬀect
for the individual decision. Results are shown in table 2. Alternative
models where age enters as a polynomial of second or higher degree do
not lead to a signiﬁcant change in the estimation results. Also, when
we add a dummy for white collar workers to equation (1) or to the
following equations (2) and (4) we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect nor a
12
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β σ t p value 95% conf interval
1 0.326 0.0173 18.8 0.0000 0.292 0.36
1000¤ -0.0158 0.00791 -2 0.0462 -0.0313 -0.00027
age 0.00209 0.000299 6.97 0.0000 0.0015 0.00267
internet -0.0469 0.00975 -4.81 0.0000 -0.0661 -0.0278
| -0.0205 0.0092 -2.23 0.0258 -0.0386 -0.00248
Conﬁdence intervals and p-values are based on a parametric bootstrap with 1000 replica-
tions.
substantial change in the estimated coeﬃcients.
We see that with increasing age oﬀers increase signiﬁcantly.
There is also a signiﬁcant gender eﬀect. Male participants oﬀer less than
female participants. This is in line with Eckel and Grossman (1998)
and Eckel and Grossman (2001) who ﬁnd men to be less generous in
dictator experiments and ultimatum games.4
The eﬀect of the medium of participation, internet or mail, is highly
signiﬁcant. Even when we control for age, oﬀers on the internet are
signiﬁcantly smaller and closer to the game theoretic solution behavior
based on material opportunism. This ﬁnding is in line with G¨ uth et al.
(2003) who also observe“more fairness in the mail than in the internet”.
SD (rejection behaviour) The right part of ﬁgure 4 shows the relation
between rejection rates and age. To measure this eﬀect we estimate the
rejection probability as a logistic function of age and other explanatory
variables. Since we see in the left part of ﬁgure 4 that older people
have more pessimistic expectations than younger people we include
expectations as an explanatory variable in the following random eﬀects
4More basically, one can control for the idiosyncratic testosterone level of male partic-
ipants (see Burnham, 2007).
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β σ z p value 95% conf interval
1 -8.09 2.54 -3.19 0.0014 -13.1 -3.11
1000¤ -1.03 0.368 -2.79 0.0053 -1.75 -0.305
oE -1.12 1.85 -0.606 0.5443 -4.74 2.5
age 0.0327 0.0406 0.806 0.4201 -0.0469 0.112
internet -0.351 1.39 -0.252 0.8009 -3.08 2.38




β1 · d1 + β1000¤ · d1000¤ + βoE · o
E + βage · age +
βinternet · dinternet + β| · d| + νi
￿
(2)
L is the standard logistic function and oE is the expected relative oﬀer.
Estimation results can be found in table 3. There are fewer signiﬁcant
eﬀects than in equation (1). This is not surprising, since most oﬀers are
accepted anyway (we have 1413 accepted and only 93 rejected oﬀers).
The small number of rejection decisions does not yield the variance
needed for highly signiﬁcant results. The only signiﬁcant factor is the
amount: Partipants are signiﬁcantly less likely to reject a share of a
large (1000¤) pie than a share of a small (100¤) pie.
What looks like increasing stubbornness of the elderly in ﬁgure 4 turns
out to be insigniﬁcant in the estimation.
Eckel and Grossman (2001) ﬁnd fewer rejections by women in ultima-
tum games. In our study we do not ﬁnd such an eﬀect.
E (expectations) Similar to equation (1) we explain expected relative of-
fers oE:
o
E = β1 · d1 + β1000¤ · d1000¤ + βage · age + βinternet · dinternet +
β| · d| + νi + ǫik (3)
14
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 006Table 4 Random eﬀects estimation of equation 3 for expected oﬀers
β σ t p value 95% conf interval
1 0.33 0.0172 19.2 0.0000 0.296 0.363
1000¤ -0.0151 0.00843 -1.8 0.0729 -0.0317 0.00141
age 0.00157 0.000312 5.04 0.0000 0.000958 0.00218
internet -0.0464 0.00985 -4.71 0.0000 -0.0657 -0.0271
| 0.0048 0.00933 0.514 0.6073 -0.0135 0.0231
Conﬁdence intervals and p-values are based on a parametric bootstrap with 1000 replica-
tions.
Table 5 Random eﬀects estimation of equation 2 for expected rejection rates
β σ z p value 95% conf interval
1 -1.33 0.247 -5.39 0.0000 -1.82 -0.848
1000¤ -0.368 0.127 -2.89 0.0038 -0.618 -0.119
age 0.0056 0.00435 1.29 0.1979 -0.00292 0.0141
internet 0.0357 0.139 0.257 0.7975 -0.237 0.308
| -0.163 0.129 -1.26 0.2071 -0.415 0.09
Results are shown in table 4 and do not diﬀer much from estimation
results for actual oﬀers (table 2). Expected oﬀers are smaller when
stakes are higher, expected oﬀers increase with age and are smaller in
the internet. Only the (weakly signiﬁcant) gender eﬀect that we found
for actual oﬀers disappears for expected oﬀers. Men expect the same
oﬀers as women.
As in equation (2) we explain expected rejection rates with a logistic
regression with random eﬀects. Since the rejection decision of another
person can not depend on the own expectation equation 4 does not
contain the expected oﬀer oE.
P(reject) = L
￿
β1 · d1 + β1000¤ · d1000¤ + βage · age +
βinternet · dinternet + β| · d| + νi
￿
(4)
We show results in table 4. As in the comparison of equation (1) and
(3), also estimation results for equations (2) and (4) are not too diﬀerent
15
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 006Figure 5 Own choices and expectations in the newspaper experiment
oﬀers acceptance decision













































































The area of the circles (in the left diagram) and the area of the rectangles (in the right
diagram) is proportional to the number of observations. The dashed line shows an OLS
regression of expectations on oﬀers.
from each other. Correctly, participants expect smaller rejection rates
when stakes are larger. Older people and male participants expect
higher rejection rates.
Let us next have a look at consistency of expectations. Do participants
who make generous oﬀers also expect those oﬀers? And are participants who
expect frequent rejections more likely to reject themselves? The answer to
both questions is “yes”. The left graph in Figure 5 shows a bubbleplot of
expectations over oﬀers. We clearly see that on the individual level oﬀers
and expectations are correlated. Participants who make small oﬀers expect
others to make small oﬀers, too. Participants who are generous expect other
to be generous as well. The right graph in ﬁgure 5 shows a mosaicplot of
actual and expected rejection decisions. Again, we ﬁnd that expectations
are in line with choices. Participants who expect a rejection rate of 0 do
not reject themselves. There are not many participants who expect a high
rejection rate but those who do will reject rather frequently.
16
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Lab research is often questioned by arguing that
1. the stakes are minor5,
2. student participants may not be representative6, and
3. experimental games are far too abstract.
What this altogether concerns is the external validity of typical lab research
in experimental economics. Here we did not try to overcome 3. All what we
can say to defend our choice of game, the Yes-No-game, is that it
• is simple enough to be understood by reasonably educated newspaper
readers and executives (possibly without an academic background) and
• captures some important aspect of life, namely the need to accept or
reject some deal whose proﬁtability has already been determined or
manipulated but is not known to the responder.
With respect to 1., we are rather certain that we have explored stake de-
pendence in a satisfying way, once by quite high pie sizes (even the small
pie (100¤) is quite large compared to usual pie amounts) and once by vary-
ing stakes by a factor of 10. Of course, one might object that the random
selection of only 20 pairs questions the stake size. There is, however, little
evidence for such random payment eﬀects (see, for instance Cubitt et al.,
1998). And as already mentioned, we agree that students are not represen-
tative, since they belong to a rather narrow age bracket. We have found
two important socio-demographic variables: age and the medium (mail vs.
internet). Even after controlling that media use changes with age, we could
5In view of the low-cost hypothesis (e.g. Kirchg¨ assner, 1999) predicting more ethical
behavior when its costs are low, small stakes could, for instance, explain other regarding
concerns.
6We partly conﬁrm this by the strong age dependency of behavior but otherwise prove
the external validity since the results for newspaper readers, executives, and students are
rather similar.
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and more material opportunism in the internet”.
Compared to the typical lab results we observe more generous oﬀers but
also more frequent rejections. This qualitatively conﬁrms our expectation
that student participants in a lab environment react more clearly to subtle
strategic details7 like not knowing the oﬀer by a generous oﬀer) and by re-
jecting less often (in line with the principles of“in dubio pro reo”or“in dubio
pro meo”, see Gehrig et al. (2007)). Outside the lab participants thus tend
to be nicer but also more suspicious, i.e., less likely to trust that others will
not try to exploit them. This tendency of our newspaper participants points
into the direction of behavior, usually observed in ultimatum experiments,
what seems to conﬁrm our expectation that newspaper participants react less
clearly to subtle diﬀerences in the rules of the game than typical lab partic-
ipants. A more direct test of such game dependency should, of course, rely
on a within-subjects design where participants confront diﬀerent game types
like ultimatum, Yes-No, and/or dictator games rather than only diﬀerent pie
sizes as in our experiment. To the best of our knowledge, we are not aware
of newspaper experiments exploring such game dependency.
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